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A Comparative Framing Analysis of
Embedded and Behind-the-Lines
Reporting on the 2003 Iraq War
Jim A. Kuypers & Stephen D. Cooper

A 2003 study by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found
that “Most Americans (53 percent) believe that news organizations are politically
biased, while just 29 percent say they are careful to remove bias from their reports” (Harper, 2004). Although it would seem that the audience for news has a
strong concern that news products are slanted in some way, scholarly opinion on
the media bias issue is far from settled (Cooper, in press; Vatz, 2003).
Although a contested position, we believe that reporters and editors frame the
news in a way that reflects their personal feelings and newsroom culture (Kuypers,
1997, 2002, 2005; Cooper, in press). Audiences usually receive their political news
from only a few press sources; rarely do they read the original statements of those
being reported upon. Yet all that one has to do to see how the press changes-regardless of intentionality--the meaning of covered material is to compare the
frames used by the press with those in the material being reported. For example, if
the press reports on a politician’s speech, compare the actual speech to the press
accounts of that speech.
Cohen (1963) made an astute observation: the press “may not be very successful in telling its readers what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its
readers what to think about” (p. 13). For example, McCombs and Shaw (1972)
found that voters learn about an issue in direct proportion to the attention given
that issue by the press, and that voters tend to share what the media defines as
important. This is called agenda setting. Subsequent studies into agenda setting
confirmed that the media have enormous influence upon political decision making,
and that they are considerably influential in telling the general population what to

think about. In short, there is a direct correlation between the amount of news
coverage of an issue and the level of importance the public assigns to that issue.
Moving beyond studies of agenda setting, one finds that the news media also
suggest how one should think. Kuypers (1997, 2002, 2005) called this agendaextension, and it occurs when the press moves beyond a neutral reporting of events.
One manifestation of agenda extension is in the framing of news stories. A frame is
“a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what
is at issue” (Gamson, 1989, p. 157). Facts remain neutral until framed; thus, how
the press frames an issue or event will affect public understanding of that issue or
event. On this point Gamson argued that facts “take on their meaning by being
embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and gives them coherence,
selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others” (p. 157). Framing thus
elevates the salience of some facts over others. A powerful example of agenda
extension is found in a study by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991). These
researchers used mandatory testing for HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) as
the issue for their study. They found that the effect “of framing is to prime values
differentially, establishing the salience of the one or the other. [A] majority of the
public supports the rights of persons with AIDS [acquired imuno-deficiency syndrome] when the issue is framed to accentuate civil liberties considerations--and
supports . . . mandatory testing when the issue is framed to accentuate public health
considerations” (p. 52). Whereas agenda setting would allow us to count the
instances of press comments on this topic, framing analysis allows us to discover
how the comments shape our perceptions of the topic.
Although it can be argued that providing contextual cues for interpretation of
events is a necessary part of reporting, when journalists infuse their political preferences into news stories the potential for manipulation of audience perceptions
increases. This becomes especially important when one considers that a powerful
feature of frames is that they define problems, causes, and solutions, although not
necessarily in that order (Kuypers, 1997, 2002; Entman, 1993). In addition, they
provide the journalist’s moral judgments concerning these problems, causes, and
solutions (Kuypers, 2002, in press). In short, when journalists frame, they construct
a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted in a specific way. Thus journalists can, knowingly or unknowingly, guide
the interpretation of readers toward a particular point of view.

Comparative Framing Analysis: One War, Two Frames
A fruitful way to study frames is with comparative framing analysis (Kuypers,
1997, 2002; Entman, 1991). In the present study we looked for differences in war
reporting between journalists embedded with combat units and journalists based
behind-the-lines. Embedded reporters were those who traveled with combat troops
and essentially co-existed with a particular unit in the field. Behind-the-lines reporters were those reporters positioned away from the combat or even based in the
USA. The stories we analyzed appeared in the New York Times and Washington
Post .
Using these two papers has its advantages and drawbacks. One advantage is that
both papers are still considered papers of records. Another advantage is that both
have the necessary resources to fund continuous coverage of any topic, thus differences in framing are unlikely to flow from limited staff or resources. The drawback
is that we analyzed the news products of a small number of reporters. Although we
feel it quite unlikely, it is conceivable that some differences in framing between the
stories of embedded journalists and those of behind-the-lines journalists observed
in this study are not representative of news outlets in general, but rather are a
feature of these two particular newspapers. To the extent possible, we matched
stories run by embedded reporters and behind-the-lines reporters by date of publiccation. This was done to reduce the possibility that any framing differences observed were due to changes in combat conditions, rather than a property of the journalistic environment. As a practical matter, one day’s difference in date was still considered to be a match. We limited our pool of stories to hard news stories and
featured commentaries on the day’s events; we did not examine every story about
the war. Rather, we chose stories from embedded and behind-the-lines reporters
that were about the same event so that we could look for any differences in how
the reporters framed the event.
We examined 66 stories published between 21 March 2003 and 10 April 2003;
26 from embedded reporters and 40 from behind-the-lines reporters. Our analysis
discovered two prominent themes in coverage of the war: the strength of Iraqi
army resistance and the response of the Iraqi civilian population to the Allied
incursion. Because of space limitations, the following two sections only illustrate
the framing differences we observed in the coverage.

Iraqi Military Resistance
Stories written by embedded reporters described Iraqi soldiers surrendering;
Iraqi positions destroyed by artillery and aircraft attacks; Iraqi soldiers deserting;
and Allied officers surprised by the weakness of Iraqi resistance. In contrast,
stories written by behind-the-lines journalists featured Allied casualties and equipment losses; the potential for unconventional attacks by the Iraqi military; the
ferocity of paramilitary or irregular Iraqi forces; the possibility of urban combat
situations in cities such as Baghdad; and the belligerent rhetoric of Iraqi officials.
Stories about the commencement of hostilities ran on 21 March 2003. In the
New York Times, the headline of the story filed by an embedded reporter was,
“G.I.’s and Marines See Little Iraqi Resistance” (Myers, 2003, March 21). Much of
this story described how easily the Allied forces overran the Iraqi border defenses,
and noted that “the first two border posts turned out to be empty, their soldiers
having fled.” The headline of the story filed from Kuwait was quite different: “16
Die On Copter; U.S. and British Forces Suffer First Losses in Crash in Kuwait”
(Tyler, 2003, March 21). Two days later, a story by another embedded reporter
described many Iraqi soldiers surrendering, and only limited resistance. This story
framed the combat as “general retreat by the Iraqis with groups of fierce holdouts”
(Filkins, 2003, March 23). In contrast, the headline story in that issue (Tyler, 2003,
March 23), with a Kuwait dateline, emphasized Allied casualties and loss of
vehicles, mentioned “heavy fighting and mortar exchanges” from the Iraqi forces,
and commented that there was “no outward sign Saturday that either the
government or military command of Mr. Hussein was wavering.” In the next day’s
issue a front-page opinion piece (Apple, 2003, March 24), datelined Washington,
described the Iraqi resistance as stiffening, and tougher than Allied commanders
had expected. An overview article (Collins, 2003, March 24) referred to the
coming “showdown with the Iraqi Republican Guard,” described the area around
Baghdad as “intensely defended,” and commented that on the prior day “allied
forces faced the fiercest fighting of the war so far and suffered their grimmest
casualty toll.”
The contrast between the frames of the behind-the-lines journalists and the
frames of the embedded reporters was even more striking as the serious fighting
for control of Baghdad began. The headline of a hard news story by a journalist
based in Baghdad (Shadid, 2003, April 3) referred to the coming “climactic

defense” of the city. Iraqi officials were described as “defiant,” and said to “boast
that the country’s most vaunted units are primed to repel an assault for which they
have planned for years.” This story continued the frame that the battle would
become “block-by-block guerilla warfare, with civilians caught in between.” An
analysis by behind-the-lines journalists (Ricks & Weisman, 2003, April 3) framed
the situation as a “dilemma” for the Allied forces, who faced urban combat against
“Hussein’s most loyal fighters, drawn from the Republican Guard and his bodyguard Special Republican Guard,” who might be planning to “hol[e] up in the city
and wag[e] a grinding war of attrition.” The lead story (Chandrasekaran & Baker,
2003, April 3), datelined Kuwait City, did describe resistance to the Allied advance
as “only patchy,” but nonetheless framed the situation as “the climactic battle--/and
the most dangerous.”
This is in stark contrast to stories from the embedded reporters of the Washington Post . One story (Branigin, 2003, April 3) was headlined, “No Sign of Capital
Defenses.” This reporter’s unit encountered “surprisingly little resistance,” and the
Republican Guard units were described as “disintegrating,” with no sign of “the
heavy Iraqi equipment expected to mount the main defense of Baghdad.” Another
story (Finer, 2003, April 3) described a unit moving “more than 70 miles through
Iraq’s central desert in an advance that met little opposition.” These troops took
control of a strategically important airfield abandoned by a “fleeing Iraqi army.”
The war front moved into Baghdad over the next few days. Stories from embedded reporters painted a mixed picture of relative quiet punctuated by firefights, but
the stories from behind-the lines journalists based in Baghdad--now close to the
front lines!--tended to emphasize the intensity of the fighting. An embedded
reporter described a unit searching for Iraqi troops in a suburb of Baghdad, but
finding only abandoned positions (Finer, 2003, April 8). The army unit occupying
the airport in Baghdad encountered only “sporadic” resistance (Branigin, 2003,
April 7), but another brigade tasked with securing an intersection in the southern
part of the city became involved in “five hours of killing and fiery chaos”
(Branigin, 2003, April 8). An embedded reporter detailed a protracted firefight at a
river crossing (Filkins, 2003, April 8), and characterized the Iraqi resistance as
“tough, but uncoordinated.”
Stories filed by behind-the-lines journalists framed the hostilities as being more
intense. One described Baghdad as having become a “war zone,” and referred to
Republican Guard troops and armament having “poured into the capital,” while

irregular forces carrying rocket propelled grenades moved in the streets (Shadid,
2003, April 6). Another described the gun battles as “fierce” and the Allied
advance as “grinding” (Tyler, 2003, April 7). As Allied forces began consolidating
their control of the city, Iraqi resistance was still described as “fierce” (Burns,
2003, April 8; Shadid & Chandrasekaran, 2003, April 8). An analysis in the New
York Times (Apple, 2003, April 9; Apple, 2003, April 10) characterized the
resistance as “stubborn,” and commented that “news of fierce fighting in Hilla . . .
belies talk of collapse.”
Iraqi Civilian Response to the Allied Forces
Another important theme in the coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom was the
response of Iraqi civilians to the incursion by Allied forces. Early reporting, both
from embedded reporters and behind-the-lines reporters, dealt mostly with combat
operations, but a distinct theme of civilian response developed after the first week
or so of fighting.
In general, the reporting from behind-the-lines journalists featured collateral
damage caused by combat; privations suffered by Iraqi civilians after combat
passed through their areas; and resentment toward occupation troops. In contrast,
reports from embedded journalists described positive interactions between Allied
soldiers and Iraqi civilians; Allied efforts to restore basic utilities to the civilian
population; Iraqi civilians’ fear of reprisals by Baath Party and Saddam Fedayeen
members; and civilians celebrating the collapse of the Hussein regime.
Initially cautious, civilian response to Allied troops grew warmer after the first
week of combat, at least in the reports from embedded reporters. Two stories described Iraqis standing by the road and waving at convoys headed toward Baghdad
(Branigin, 2003, April 3; Finer, 2003, April 3). Several stories from a journalist
embedded with units entering Najaf (Atkinson, 2003, April 2; Atkinson, 2003,
April 3; Atkinson, 2003, April 10) likewise framed the civilian response as welcoming, even in the turmoil of war. In the first, civilians were described smiling at
American troops, clapping, and “gestur[ing] impatiently for the Americans to press
deeper into the city center.” The next day’s story framed the welcome as “jubilant,” but noted residents’ concerns that food and water had become scarce.
Another reporter embedded with troops approaching Baghdad described civilians
“cheering and encouraging the troops as they passed,” framing what he saw as

“one of the warmest receptions the Americans have gotten to date” (Filkins, 2003,
April 4). An Iraqi civilian fleeing Baghdad was quoted as saying, “You have saved
us, you have saved us from him.”
Stories written behind-the-lines, covering the same time period, were strikingly
different in their framing of the civilian response to the Allied incursion. One story
described the burial of a young boy killed in Baghdad (Shadid, 2003, March
31).Although the story noted that the boy may well have been killed by shrapnel
from Iraqi antiaircraft fire, it framed the residents of the neighborhood as angry at
the USA for civilian casualties and resentful at the prospect of an occupation. A
story datelined from Zubair (Glasser, 2003, April 5), filed after the fighting had
moved on to Basra, described civilians’ “ambivalence” about the incursion in this
way: “On the streets, children wave and smile at passing British troops. At the
now-empty police station, a banner hangs. Shame on America, it says.”
An analysis in the New York Times (Apple, 2003, April 6) referred to “the
natural tendency of many Iraqis to feel their patriotic impulses bruised by the
presence of heavily armed invaders [emphasis added] in their midst.” This is in
stark contrast to the frame of an embedded reporter’s story (LeDuff, 2003, April 8)
about American troops entering a town of 45,000: “by noon it was apparent that
the townspeople considered [the troops] liberators.” The crowd’s reaction is
described as “euphoria,” and a resident was quoted as saying, “you are owed a
favor from the Iraqis. . . . We are friends.”
Discussion
Reporting about Operation Iraqi Freedom differed greatly between embedded
and behind-the-lines reporters. The embedded journalists often described the war
in terms of the weakness of Iraqi army resistance; the frequency with which regular
Iraqi forces deserted or surrendered; and the joy of Iraqi civilians at the demise of
the Hussein regime. Their stories described the confusion and uncertainty of firefights; the tedium and fatigue inherent in warfare; the precise targeting of Allied
ordinance; the pinpoint destruction such weapons produced; and friendly interactions between Allied soldiers and Iraqi civilians.
Stories filed by behind-the-lines journalists described the war in terms of the
potential of Iraqi forces to mount significant unconventional counterattacks; the

ferocity of the Iraqi irregular forces; the inadequacy of Allied war planning; and
the vulnerability of the Allies’ long supply lines. These stories emphasized civilian
anger at collateral damage; interruptions to utility infrastructure; and mistrust of
American intentions.
In part, these differences in framing can be attributed to the activities and
conditions reporters could directly observe. Embedded journalists, traveling with
combat forces, directly experienced the tedium, intensity, danger, and uncertainty
of those situations; they observed first-hand the dominance of Allied tactics and
weaponry, and the elation of Iraqi civilians as the Hussein regime disintegrated.
Behind-the-lines journalists witnessed different aspects of the war. At a physical
distance from the actual fighting, their stories concerned the uncertainty and
unpredictability of the war’s course, the anarchy that sometimes developed when
the control mechanisms of the Hussein regime collapsed, the potential--but not the
actuality--for significant Iraqi military resistance and counterattacks, and the
belligerent rhetoric of the Iraqi Minister of Information.
We feel it implausible to attribute the framing differences to military control
over the reporting of the embedded reporters. The Department of Defense directive
that established embedding as policy (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003) specifically ruled out interference with reporters’ copy (paragraph 3.R), stated that the
purpose of embedding was to maximize reporters’ access to information paragraph
2.A), and required that restrictions on the release of information in their possession
had to be justified (paragraph 3.R).
The practice of embedding journalists with combat units was a significant
change in Department of Defense media policy (Cooper, 2003). Embedding
replaced the pool coverage used in the Persian Gulf War, which had prompted
complaints from news outlets and organizations about restricted access to the
combat theater. Journalists covering the 2003 Iraq War also had the option of being
credentialed as “unilateral,” which meant they were not affiliated with a particular
combat unit, but did not enjoy the logistical support, physical protection, or
immediate access to operations provided to the embedded journalists. Some
journalists chose to cover the war as unilaterals (Fisher, 2003; Ricchiardi, 2003a).
Prior to the start of hostilities, there was a predictable skepticism about the
promised openness of the combat theater to journalists (e.g., Bushell & Cunningham, 2003; Ricchiardi, 2003a), and concern about the possibility that embedded
journalists would lose the required critical distance from the events they covered

(e.g., Bedway, 2003; Chasen, 2003; Cockburn, 2003; Jensen, 2003; Martin, 2003;
Strupp & Berman, 2003). In general, however, the embedding policy proved
satisfactory to both the military and the press (Blumenthal & Rutenberg, 2003;
Cooper, 2003; Fisher, 2003; Galloway, 2003; Mitchell & Bedway, 2003;
Ricchiardi, 2003b; Rieder, 2003; Shooting at the Messenger, 2003; Zinsmeister,
2003). Moreover, returning journalists have not voiced complaints about their
experiences while embedded, and many papers have continued with the practice
(Arrieta-Walden, 2004). In sum, any notion that the copy of embedded reporters
was censored by the military while that of behind-the-lines journalists was free
from interference--and that the framing differences are attributable to the greater
freedom of the behind-the-lines journalists--is not supported.
One of the persistent problems in the discussion of media bias is the question of
a baseline measurement against which any purported bias can be measured. We do
not mean to suggest here that the embedded reporters were somehow free of
preconceptions that might color their field reports. It is worth noting, however, that
both the embedded and the behind-the-lines journalists were drawn from the same
pool; that is to say, all reporters were acculturated into the current norms of their
profession, before they reported on the war. To what, then, can those differences in
the framing of their war reporting be attributed?
Although we cannot conclusively demonstrate this to be the case, we strongly
feel it likely that behind-the-lines reporters were less able than embedded reporters
to divorce themselves from the editorial positions of their respective papers, and
the general climate of media opposition concerning military action. After all, while
embedded reporters were relaying their eye-witness testimony, behind-the-lines
reporters relied on second hand accounts filtered through their preconceptions concerning the outcome of the war (Kuypers, 2002). Here lies the important point of
this study. The power of the behind-the-lines reporters’ established frames greatly
influenced how they reported the war; whereas embedded reporters, observing
direct contradictions of their previously established frames, were in a better position to report on what they actually witnessed. In some sense, then, this presented
audiences with a choice on how to view the war. Embedded reporters presented a
much more positive view of US military actions and possibilities than did their
behind-the-lines counterparts. Once the practice of embedded reporting diminished, readers increasingly lost this choice, because the previously established and
dominate framing of the mainstream press returned (Kuypers, in press).
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